ABSTRACT
Utilitarianism is the most prominent social welfare function in economics. We present three new axiomatic characterizations of utilitarian (that is, additively-separable) social welfare functions in a setting where there is risk over both population size and individuals' welfares. We first show that, given uncontroversial basic axioms, Blackorby et al.'s (1998) Expected Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarianism is equivalent to a new axiom holding that it is better to allocate higher utility-conditional-on-existence to possible people who have a higher probability of existence. The other two characterizations extend and clarify classic axiomatizations of utilitarianism from settings with either social risk or variable-population, considered alone.
ABSTRACT
Public transfer programs in industrial nations are thought to benefit the elderly through pension and health care programs at the expense of the young and future generations. However, this intergenerational picture changes if public education is also considered as a transfer program. We calculate the net present value (NPV) of benefits received minus taxes paid for US generations born 1850 to 2090. Surprisingly, all generations 1950 to 2050 are net gainers, while many current elderly are losers. Windfall gains from starting Social Security and Medicare partially offset windfall losses from starting public education, roughly consistent with the Becker-Murphy theory.